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The Curious Case of Formal Theory  
in Political Science:  
How Did It Emerge as a Discipline, Why Its Existence 
Is a Sign of a Failure, and Why the Science of Politics 
Is Not Possible Without It? 
Abstract. American political science has evolved a subfield which is commonly referred 
to as formal theory. Political scientists identify themselves as specializing in formal theory, 
departments advertise faculty positions in formal theory and put together formal theory 
subfields that offer undergraduate and graduate curricula. The roots of the field can be traced 
to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’ message, however, seems to have been utterly ignored by the 
social science. William Riker’s second launch of “Hobbesian advice”, in 1950’s and 60’s, proved 
more successful and put the field of formal theory on the map of political science. Yet, the 
very existence of the formal theory field can be seen as the failure of both Hobbes and Riker. 
There seems to be a continuing need for teaching social scientists why they should construct 
a proper science and how they should do it. This paper is an attempt to meet this need. 
I believe that the future science of politics will have to follow in the footsteps of Hobbes and 
Riker. And so will other social sciences. My point in the paper is not new; the way I make it, is. 
Keywords: formal theory, axiomatic theory, formal theory field in political science.
1. Introduction
The “formal theory” label used by political scientists has always struck me 
as odd. Possibly because I could not imagine a field of “formal theory” evolving, 
for instance, in physics. In fact, I do not know of any other discipline of science 
in which a form of a theory became a label for a field of inquiry. Clearly, the very 
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use of a qualifier “formal” implies that such theories are special, possibly rare, 
and that the common understanding and use of the notion of theory is different. 
For anyone interested in the general methodology of science, this singularity of 
political science may be interesting to note and to reflect on. Hence, one of my 
objectives is to bring this case to the attention of those who may find it worth-
while from the perspective of philosophy of science or general methodology.
My other objective is to provide an easy to read text on (formal) theory 
construction for social scientists. In my experience there is a widespread need 
for a basic reflection on the form and the benefits of a properly constructed 
theory in all social sciences with a possible exception of economics.1 The 
absence of short and simple texts on the subject reinforces this problem. My 
goal is to reach those who would want to learn on their own as well as those 
who would want their students to better understand why this form of theory 
construction is important to use and necessary to accept as an integral part 
of any scientific endeavor. 
My third, and last, objective is to engage yet a different group of scholars. 
Many philosophers and mathematicians will find the idea of writing about 
theory construction as antiquated and trivial. This is understandable. Yet, many 
in this group work within well formulated theories and rarely, if ever, face a prob-
lem of theory construction. Even fewer would ever deal with a case in which 
they observe an empirical phenomenon and have to formalize it from scratch. 
This is a very different problem than working with deductions and one that can 
be sufficiently difficult and fascinating to attract mathematicians like John von 
Neumann to the social sciences. Still, I know of a good number of mathemati-
cians and other scientists who seem to dismiss social science as a domain where 
any interesting deductive work has been or can be done. Famously, Stanisław 
1 In my experience it is very common for students graduating with a political science degree 
not to have seen a formal theory nor to have reflected on the benefits of having one. This is less 
frequent, though still not uncommon, among graduate students and faculty members in political 
science. The same can be said about sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists. Econom-
ics is the only exception since it routinely exposes students to formal theories, like preference 
theory and expected utility theory, that are fundamental to modern economic theory. These 
claims derive from my many interactions with students and faculty from all disciplines of social 
science associated with dozens of universities worldwide. Barring a close-to-zero probability of 
being exposed to a very skewed sample, my observation should have a dose of generality to it.
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Ulam has once challenged Paul Samuelson (Samuelson 1969, p.9) to name 
“one proposition in all of the social sciences which is both true and non-trivial.” 
Some thirty years later Samuelson provided an answer to this challenge.2 We 
are less likely, perhaps, to witness such a challenge today, since the underlying 
attitude towards economics has changed, though I think a challenge of naming 
a non-trivial theory in political science, or sociology, is as likely to come from 
a mathematician today as it was back when Ulam has posed his challenge to 
Samuelson. For those who cannot name a “true and non-trivial proposition” in 
political science I would like to offer a few very simple examples.
In short, regardless of the reader’s academic discipline this paper may 
have something useful to offer to everyone. The value for political scientists 
may be in realizing the significance of the proper formulation of a problem. 
I hope they will see that “formal theory” is more than a subfield of political 
science, or a short-lived fad, it is rather the only proper way to go about 
theory construction if we ever hope to turn political science into a cumula-
tive body of knowledge. This point should also be useful for other social 
scientists including economists some of whom get frustrated with dismal 
predictive power of “formal” theories in economics and turn, unwisely so, 
against the very scientific method used to construct these theories. Some 
mathematicians may take my bait and choose to look up my answers to 
the Ulam challenge. Perhaps they will start constructing, and solving, their 
own puzzles of human behavior. Finally, anyone with interest in the phi-
losophy of science, or general methodology, may find the very existence 
of the formal field in political science, and some historical details behind 
it, to be an interesting and useful anecdote with some important lessons 
to learn or to teach.
I begin the paper by recalling Hobbes’ advice from Leviathan that, ironically, 
was used by Wilder, an influential mathematician in 1950s, to open a chapter 
on axiomatic theory. The case of a prominent mathematician who brings up 
Hobbes whose advice was utterly ignored by political science all the while 
2 Samuelson later wrote about Ulam’s testing question: “This was a test I always failed. By 
now, some thirty years later (…) an appropriate answer occurs to me: The Ricardian theory of 
comparative advantage.” (Samuelson 1969, p.9)
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Leviathan remained a required reading for all in the discipline3 makes for an 
anecdote that was difficult for me to pass. More importantly, though, I find it 
important for the social scientists to remember that the proper form of a theory 
has been argued for and pointed to by Hobbes centuries before it started being 
used in the modern social science. Someday, perhaps, Hobbes’ main legacy 
would be seen as that of a protagonist of a scientific social science. Possibly 
this was also on Wilder’s mind when he tuned to Hobbes for an opening quote.
Hobbes’ advice on theory construction fell on deaf ears among social sci-
entists and it took some three hundred years to change that. The change came 
through some major developments in economics; in political science it was 
largely driven by the efforts of William Riker and the so called Rochester School. 
I will later describe the intellectual roots and the significance of the Rochester 
School for modern political science. While Riker and his students have effec-
tively changed modern political science the very existence of the “formal theory” 
field proves that the main massage of Hobbes and the Rochester School is still 
lost on the discipline. The day this message settles in there will be no need to 
single out formal theory lest make it a special field of political science. While 
nearly all political scientists have heard of Prisoners’ Dilemma and many can 
write it down and explain, only a handful would fully understand the details of 
the model including the properties of payoffs.4 People use products of a proper 
theory construction but do not understand their basic properties. The very 
purpose of a proper form of science is completely lost on them. For this reason, 
in the last part of the paper I will go back to Hobbes’ point one more time. To 
make the point obvious I will use some of the simplest examples I could have 
3 Hobbes’ Leviathan is one of the most important works in the history of social science and 
one of fundamental importance for political science. The reason, however, is the importance of 
Hobbes’ explanation of the emergence of state rather than his singular effort to follow Euclid’s 
theory construction. A short comment preceding excerpts from Leviathan in the Princeton 
Readings in Political Thought (Cohen 1996) are typical in that regard.
4 I can name scores in the discipline who thought that using identical payoffs for different 
players means that we assume that they have identical utilities and requires interpersonal util-
ity comparisons, or those who thought that negative payoffs signify displeasure while positive 
pleasure, or finally those whom I have asked to tell me what is the difference between ordinal 
and cardinal payoff only to find out they have never heard of either. Some people in this set 
are prominent scholars, many use games in their research. This, by no measure, can indicate 
a success of Hobbes or Riker. 
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thought about. Even if I fail to convince anyone to change the ways they prac-
tice social science I hope to be convincing enough to make them see that the 
standard practice of social science cannot possibly be a long term equilibrium. 
It may take decades or centuries but at some point Hobbes will not only get his 
message through but will effectively change the social science.
2. The message of Hobbes that social science chose to ignore
Perhaps the most striking aspect of formal theories in the social sciences is 
their ubiquitous absence rather than occasional presence. For most social scien-
tists a theory corresponds, roughly, to a statement “x affects y” like in “the level of 
education affects the level of income.” The relation between x and y would be typi-
cally assumed to be of the form y = bx + a, and a and b are parameters estimated 
from the data. The more “complex” theories would assume that y is affected by 




y x e dx
−−= ∫  , for instance, since how could we possibly come up 
with this functional form if we don’t have a set of more fundamental principles, 
a theory, to derive it from? Most statistical tools require that we specify a function, 
or a class of functions, before we do any data analysis. The functions used in such 
statistical analyses are commonly understood as theories. Linear functions of the 
general form have been, by far, the most common type of “theories” generated 
in the social science. This literally is what most social scientists understand by 
“theory.” It is embarrassingly uncommon for them to think of a theory the way 
their colleagues in science think about theories, that is, as built of undefined terms 
(the elementary building blocks), assumptions (axioms) defining their properties, 
and deductive consequences (theorems) of these assumptions. For this reason, 
I find it perversely amusing to see Raymond Wilder, a leading mathematician 
of his days, opening an essay on theory construction with a quote from Thomas 
Hobbes’ “Leviathan” originally published in 1651:
“The errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds; and 
lead men into absurdities, which at last they see but cannot avoid, without reckoning 
anew from the beginning.”5
5 Hobbes (1651, 1981 edition).
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A pure mathematician using a quote from a father of political science 
and one of the great classics of the social science to tag an explanation of the 
modern form of scientific theory presents an awkward dilemma for the social 
science: Has Hobbes’ advice, realized with a great success by mathematics and 
hard science, been blatantly ignored by most of the mainstream social theory 
for centuries, and all that while “Leviathan” has never stopped to be one of the 
most widely assigned and read pieces of social science? Well, yes. And it puts 
social sciences in an embarrassing situation, especially that Hobbes’ advice 
is hardly controversial.
Hobbes’ point, to put it in the crudest way, is that science6 cannot be 
built on ill defined, or non-defined, concepts. This sounds rather obvious. 
If we make inferences using concepts that we don’t understand―and how 
can we understand something that is ill defined? ―we can only make a bad 
problem worse.7 For sure we won’t be able to explain these concepts to oth-
ers, which is to say that if we don’t know what we are talking about, it would 
be unreasonable to expect someone else to understand it. The first problem 
leads to absurd conclusions, the second prevents an accumulation of knowl-
edge; either and both make the development of science impossible. This is 
a general observation and one that should apply to any endeavor aspiring 
to be called “science.” 
Hobbes might have felt uneasy about preaching the obvious as well. After 
all, he was merely repeating points that have been made twenty centuries 
ago by Aristotle and then implemented by Euclid in “Elements.” “Elements” 
were, in fact, Hobbes’ blueprint for constructing a scientific argument, so 
much so that he called it “the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto 
to bestow on mankind.”8 Hobbes organization of “Leviathan” is meant to 
6 I use the term “science” in its most general meaning, not one that merely restricts it to 
“physical science.” 
7 In Hobbes’ words “(…) a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what 
every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled 
in words, as a bird in lime-twigss; the more he struggles, the more belimed.”
8 Indeed, Euclid’s “Elements” have been the only axiomatic theory in existence for many 
centuries. The modern form of axiomatic theory is typically credited to Hilbert and his 1899 
axiomatization of Euclidean geometry. For a fascinating account of the history Hobbes accidental 
inspiration by “Elements” see Macpherson (1985.)
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follow the construction of “Elements.”9 In fact, “Of Man,” the first book of 
“Leviathan,” is not only an implementation of a properly constructed theory 
but it also constitutes a proof that science—and indeed any reasonable form 
of human communication—cannot be practiced in any other way. Hobbes’ 
implementation of Euclid’s blueprint was so good that some three and a half 
centuries later “Leviathan” still stands out in the social sciences―if we clean 
up the antiquated language and shrink the long sentences―as an example 
of clarity and rigor. This is as much a praise of Hobbes as it is a criticism of 
the social sciences. 
The fact that a scientific theory has to be constructed in a proper way 
was obvious to Hobbes and by 1950’s it was obvious to anyone working in 
mathematics and in physical sciences and to a growing number of economists 
especially those with background in mathematics or in physics10. This must 
have made Raymond Wilder11 conclude in 1952 that this form of theory 
construction “is acknowledged now as a fundamental part of the scientific 
method in every realm of human endeavor” (p.1622.) Wilder has been wrong 
when he wrote these words and he would have been wrong today. Most social 
scientists practice “science” that lacks “a fundamental part of the scientific 
method.” 
Wilder was right on a different count though. The tide was about to turn. 
In 1950’s the change has already been sweeping economics and soon it was 
about to hit political science. 
9 It has been pointed to me by one of the reviewers that Hobbes had contacts with Descartes 
and Galileo, hence Euclid was hardly the only source of his convictions. My objective here is 
not, however, to provide a comprehensive historical account.
10 By now to be accepted into a major graduate program in economics, an undergraduate 
degree in mathematics, or a coursework that comes close to getting one, is almost a prerequisite.
11 Raymond Louis Wilder (1896-1982) was a leading mathematician of his times. His 1952 
“Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics” includes a chapter on theory construction, 
“The Axiomatic Method.” It was later reprinted as an independent essay in “The World of Math-
ematics.” More than half a century after its first publication “The Axiomatic Method” remains 
an excellent introductory writing on the subject. (Wilder spent most of his academic career in 
the Department of Mathematics at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; he was a member of 
the National Academy of Sciences and served as the President of the American Mathematical 
Society and the Mathematical Association of America.)
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3. William Riker and the emergence of the formal theory field 
in political science
While the early uses of formal theory in political science can be traced 
to Black (1948), Downs (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1954) and a few others, 
there is no doubt that a subfield of political science that goes under the name 
of formal theory, rational choice theory or positive political theory (these 
names are often seen as interchangeable) is a work of one man. His name is 
William Riker. For anyone who witnessed the emergence and the growth of 
this field, “formal theory” feels largely synonymous with William Riker. Riker, 
in a sense, succeeded at implementing Hobbes’ advice for political science. 
Critical for Riker’s success was the timing of his efforts. By 1950’s math-
ematicians and logicians have refined the notion of a formal theory, which 
in these disciplines is better known as an axiomatic theory, and it became 
a standard of theory construction for an increasing number of scientists 
including a growing number of economists. In 1944 game theory has been 
launched by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s “Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior.” It quickly became a fad among mathematicians and a small, 
but influential, group of social scientists. John Nash and Lloyd Shapley were 
among the earliest followers of the fad. In 1950’s they were both graduate 
students in mathematics at Princeton and they both chose to work on game 
theory under Albert Tucker. Their doctoral theses were to lay the foundations 
of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. (Their solution concepts are 
known as Nash equilibrium and Shapley value. John Nash and Lloyd Shapley 
were both awarded Nobel Prizes for these contributions.) About the same time 
Albert Tucker, came up with a name and an interpretation of a game that was 
brought to his attention by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher.12 The name he 
proposed was Prisoner’s Dilemma. Prisoner’s Dilemma went on to become 
the single most important and most influential game in game theory. Finally, 
1951 saw the publication of Kenneth Arrow’s “Social Choice and Individual 
Values” which contained what is now known as Arrow’s Theorem. The result 
12 This story has been recounted in many writings. One of the more recent ones is (Holt 
2004).
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gave rise to social choice theory and became an important factor in awarding 
Arrow a Nobel Prize. These developments have proved to be transformative for 
all social sciences but they were particularly consequential for the science of 
politics. At a closer look the core of most of them was par excellence political.
Game theory is a general theory of interactions and as such it is relevant 
for all social sciences. Of the two branches of game theory, cooperative and 
non-cooperative, cooperative game theory was created as a theory of coali-
tion formation. Coalition formation is, of course, the domain of political 
science which made cooperative game theory impossible to ignore by politi-
cal scientists. The relevance of non-cooperative games soon became equally 
obvious. The Prisoner’s Dilemma hit at the very core of political science by 
providing a general model for a class of problems that require solution by 
government. The game’s equilibrium came to be seen as the argument for 
the necessity of state and a proof that political science cannot be subsumed 
by economics. Jon Elster made this point explicitly clear by defining politics 
as “the study of ways of transcending the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” (Elster 1976, 
p.249) In this sense Prisoner’s Dilemma became a label for the very essence 
of political science. 
Another transformative idea came from a different line of research. Central 
to this research was the work of Kenneth Arrow. Arrow (Arrow 1951, 2nd ed. 
1963) set out to formally define the core properties of a democratic choice and 
proved that they cannot all be satisfied. One way to think about Arrow’s result 
is as a formal theory of any voting rule that we would want to use in elections. 
Before we start arguing if we want to use a simple majority rule, or a plurality 
rule or approval voting or, perhaps, the American electoral system, we would 
want to sit down and specify basic properties of any acceptable democratic 
voting rule. For example, we would want a rule that treats all voters equally 
(all votes count the same) and one which when used in a two-candidate elec-
tion where every voter prefers one candidate over the other, would name the 
preferred candidate the winner. The way I always explain Arrow’s Theorem 
is by stating such—overtly obvious—properties of a democratic choice and 
ask students to think of them as articles of a constitution. I have yet to find 
a single individual who would not support it. As it turns out, democratic 
rule of choice, as defined by the articles our constitution, is a concept with an 
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empty connotation. Arrow has proved that “articles” of this “constitution” are 
inconsistent. This result, known as Arrow’s Theorem, is considered by many 
to be the most important finding in the modern political science. This is one 
of the best lessons Hobbes could have hoped for. If Arrow did not construct 
an axiomatic (formal) theory of choice, we would have never known that what 
we may want in democracy is not possible to have.
It is important for me to note that my description of the developments of 
1940’s and 50’s is not indicative of how they were seen, or recognized, in politi-
cal science. All these results came from mathematics and/or economics and 
very few political scientists knew about them or had sufficient mathematical 
training to understand this work.13 Riker who had considerable training in 
economics was an exception. Not only was he familiar with this research but he 
clearly understood its importance for political science. He was also aware that 
the timing to change political science could not have been better and through 
his own research he began to advance the new paradigm (Riker, 1963, 1982; 
Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). The scientific form of this paradigm, widely seen 
as employing formal theory construction, became central to Riker’s brand of 
political science. When in 1960’s the University of Rochester was looking for 
faculty to build analytically rigorous social science departments, Riker was an 
obvious choice for political science. Backed by a very generous support of the 
university Riker built a department that made Rochester a famous brand and 
began a transformation that created the field of political science commonly 
known as formal theory. 
Riker’s students, students of Riker’s students, and countless followers 
populate now major departments of political science offering curricula in 
formal theory at undergraduate and graduate levels. Political science seems to 
have undergone a permanent and irreversible change. And yet, I am not sure 
if the scope and the pace of the change would have been seen as satisfactory 
by Hobbes, or by Wilder. 
The bulk of political science still does not use the proper theory construc-
tion. The very use of the “formal theory” label suggests that most “theories” 
are not constructed that way; to put it bluntly, it suggests that most of political 
13 Private communication with William Riker and Peter Orheshook.
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theory is not really scientific. The inertia of the discipline and the resistance 
to change have proved to be considerable. For this reason, papers like this one 
will be written for a foreseeable future and arguments will be given for and 
against the use of formal theory construction in social science. The day when 
symbolic notation, like the one used in the formulation of preference theory, 
will cover blackboards of classes in political science the way they do now in 
physics, is still very distant. 
For this reason, anyone teaching formal theory in political science finds 
it imperative to explain to students why formal political science looks so 
much different than what they see elsewhere in the discipline. I often envy 
physicists who don’t have to justify the use of mathematics or other properly 
formalized constructs since everyone  in physics knows that this is the proper 
form of science. In the next two sections I offer two arguments which I often 
use to convince students of politics about the necessity of the proper theory 
construction. 
What I have consistently found to work best as convincing explanations 
are arguments that use short and simple examples. Each of the next two sec-
tion is built around one such example. 
4. An example that explains the necessity  
of formal political science
Sometime during the winter break of 2006/07 Nicholas Grossman, who 
was then a graduate student at the University of Maryland, stopped by my 
office to tell me about a peculiar finding he had overheard on the radio when 
driving from Connecticut to Maryland. The data concerned a study involv-
ing voters’ preferences over three Democratic front runners, John Edwards, 
Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton, who were to compete for the Democratic 
nomination in the US presidential election of 2008. The puzzle behind the 
peculiar results can be shortly described as follows.
Subjects in the study were asked to consider two candidates, Edwards and 
Clinton, for instance, and pick the one they would vote for. They were then 
asked to do the same for Edwards and Obama, and Clinton and Obama. In 
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yet another question they were asked to vote for one from the set of Edwards, 
Obama and Clinton. Interestingly, Edwards was picked by a substantial ma-
jority against Clinton and against Obama and yet when subjects were picking 
one out of three, Edwards ended up with the lowest percentage of votes. This 
has struck Grossman as an interesting, and a possibly odd, result. Indeed, the 
data seems counterintuitive enough to warrant a closer examination. 
To make the puzzle more explicit let’s conjecture specific distributions of 
choices. Assume, for instance, that Edwards was chosen by 60% over Clinton 
and by 60% over Obama; for completeness, let’s also assume than 60% chose 
Clinton over Obama. Suppose, moreover, that when asked to pick one out of 
three, 38% chose Clinton, 32% Obama, and 30% Edwards. What, if anything, 
might be wrong with this outcome?
If, indeed, there is something wrong with the assumed distributions, the 
problem must originate in subjects’ preferences over the candidates. If, for 
instance, a subject does not really know any of the three candidates but feels 
compelled to answer the questions, he may well make his choices at random. 
But choosing at random means that a person who chose Edwards over Clinton 
may choose Clinton over Edwards when asked about his preferences again. 
His choice in one instance is unrelated to his choice in the other. Is it an effect 
of such random choices that strikes us as “odd” in the data? Do we, indeed, 
intuitively expect some “consistency of choices” and this consistency is violated 
by the distribution of votes cast by the subjects? 
If the lack of consistency of choices constitutes the essence of the puzzle, 
then the solution would require that we define the conditions of consistency 
and then prove that they are violated by the data. 
And so, let’s first consider the properties of choices that would agree with 
our intuition of consistency. If, for instance, a decision maker chooses x over 
y, basic consistency, as I have already noted, would require that he does not 
choose y over x when we ask him again. Another similarly straightforward 
aspect of consistency would have a preference relation behave similar to 
a “greater than” relation on numbers: if a subject prefers x over y and y over 
z then he should also prefer x over z. Yet another set of intuitions would apply 
to cases in which a decision maker is indifferent between alternatives. Here 
our intuition would suggest that indifference is a form of equivalence. Thus, 
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for instance, a “consistent” indifference relation should not be affected by the 
order in which alternatives are presented: if a person is indifferent between x 
and y, he should also be indifferent between y and x. In addition, anyone who 
is indifferent between x and y and y and z should also be indifferent between 
x and z. One final condition would assume that subjects know the alternatives 
and, hence, can choose between them. More specifically, we will assume that 
when a decision maker compares two alternatives he would either prefer one 
over the other or be indifferent between them. 
If we agree to define our intuitions the way I have suggested, we are all 
set to construct a “formal theory” of individual decision making. In the for-
mulation I will use the following notation: D = {x, y, z,…} denotes a finite 
set of alternatives;  denotes a binary preference relation (strict), ∼ denotes 
a binary indifference relation, ¬ denotes “it is not true that,” ∀ denotes “for 
all,” ∃ denotes “there exists,” ∈ denotes “belongs to,” ⇒ denotes “implies,” ∨ 
denotes “or,” and & denotes “and.” A formal system 〈D, , ~〉 which satisfies 
the following five axioms is called theory of preferences.
A1. (COMPARABILITY) ∀x,y∈D: (x  y ∨ y  x ∨ x∼y).
A2. (ASYMMETRY OF ) ∀x,y∈D: (x  y ⇒ ¬ (y  x)). 
A3. (TRANSITIVITY OF ) ∀x,y,z∈D: ((x  y & y z ) ⇒ x  z).
A4. (SYMMETRY OF ∼) ∀x,y∈D: (x∼y ⇒ y∼x). 
A5. (TRANSITIVITY OF ∼) ∀x,y,z∈D: ((x∼y & y∼z) ⇒ x∼z).
The theory we have just formulated, known as theory of preferences, con-
stitutes the most general concept of rationality in the social sciences. For this 
reason alone, it may well be the most important formal theory of all. But there 
is another important reason for its significance. A properly constructed theory 
of choice made it possible for the science of choice to grow. The expected utility 
theory, formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1945), is a generaliza-
tion of the preference theory to the domain of choices that involve lotteries, 
i.e., probability distributions over alternatives in the domain. Game theory, 
finally, is a generalization of theories of individual decision making, i.e., theory 
of preferences and the expected utility theory, to cases in which the outcome 
is affected not only by the action of a decision maker but also by the actions 
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of others. These connections are important to note because without a proper 
formulation of a theory of preferences the path that links it with game theory 
would not have been possible. For any science to progress, it must be cumula-
tive and this cannot be done outside of properly constructed theories.
Now that we have defined a consistent choice behavior, better known 
as rational choice, we can return to the data and ask if there is any evidence 
that any of the axioms has been violated. Given the design of the study the 
only axiom that can be violated is the transitivity of the preference relation. 
Does, then, 60% choosing Edwards over Clinton, 60% choosing Edwards over 
Obama, 60% choosing Clinton over Obama, and 38% choosing Clinton, 32% 
Obama and 30% Edwards when asked to pick one out of three indicate that 
some of the subjects must have had intransitive preferences? 
The answer is given by the following example. Consider a group with the 
following (transitive) preferences over Edwards (E), Clinton (C) and Obama 
(O): 8% prefer E over O over C or EOC, in short, 22% ECO, 30% CEO, 8 COE, 
30% OEC and 2% OCE. It is easy to check that this distribution of preferences 
results in the conjectured data. And so, the intuitive feeling that something 
must be wrong with Edwards winning by considerable majority over Clinton 
and over Obama and then coming last when voters were to pick one out of 
three candidates was plain wrong.
This, of course, would not come as a surprise to anyone working with 
deductions. After all the point of any deductive science, i.e., a formal theory 
as a political scientist would say, “(…) is to start with something so simple as 
not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no 
one will believe it.” (Russell 2009) Implicit in Bertrand Russell’s words is an 
advice that working with proper science we are better off putting our intuitions 
aside since what we are heading for may be negatively correlated with them. 
This seems to be the case with the example of the voting study. 
Another lesson to be learned from the example is that formal theory, as 
the proper form of science, is necessary simply because human brain cannot 
properly process tasks of certain complexity. Just like we do not attempt to 
multiply two five digit numbers in our head we should not attempt to make 
scientific inferences outside of a properly constructed formal theory. As Rich-
ard Feynman has notably put it: “Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. 
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The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest 
person to fool.” (Coyne, 2009)14 While we widely recognize and acknowledge 
our arithmetical deficiencies and wisely use calculators when multiplying five 
digit numbers, we are not nearly as humble when it comes to our ability of 
practicing social science. If we were, the formalization of the social science 
would have started with Hobbes.
5. A trap for a barefoot empiricist
Barefoot empiricism is a common accusation used against many social 
scientists. How can we, in a simple way, see that sheer data analysis may not 
make sense without a theoretical reflection? It would be good to see it using 
the simplest theory possible. If sheer data analysis without any analytical work 
turns out to be unreasonable in the simplest instance then, obviously, it can 
only get worse as we move to more complex cases. 
Imagine that John, a student of international relations, has been studying 
networks of military alliances. A pure empiricist, John gave no thought to 
theoretical properties of such networks and set out to search for interesting 
empirical relations in the data. The data spanned many decades and for each 
point in time and every two countries it could tell John whether the pair was 
in military alliance or not. For exploratory purposes John picked an arbitrary 
year and started looking at the data. To aid his exploration he would occasion-
ally draw a graph, like these in Figure 1, with countries represented by vertices 
and alliance relation by edges; absence of an edge between two vertices means 
that the two countries were not allied.
Figure 1
14 I want to thank Jon Bendor for bringing this quote to my attention.
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Imagine now two unrelated scenarios of what could have been the out-
come of John’s analyses.
Situation 1. After a careful examination of alliances in all groups of coun-
tries, and at all points in time, John discovered a remarkable regularity: It was 
always the case that if a was allied with b and b was allied with c then a was 
also allied with c. Since this property is called transitivity in the jargon of 
“relational properties,” we can say that John has discovered ubiquitous transi-
tivity of the alliance relation. This regularity has struck him as one of obvious 
significance and since no one else had noticed it before, John felt that he made 
an important discovery.
Now, let’s reverse the time, assume that Situation 1 has never happened 
and John did not notice transitivity simply because there was no transitivity in 
the data. Situation 1 aside, however, the data might have held other interesting 
regularities for John to observe. The next situation describes one such scenario.
Situation 2. Suppose that John, like many scholars of international rela-
tions, was interested in the concept of power. One possible index of country’s 
power is its number of allies. Since more allies makes one more powerful 
(other factors equal), John started examining patterns in the number of allies. 
One thought that has crossed John’s mind was to look for cases where every 
country has a different number of allies. In such cases countries would form 
a strict “power hierarchy” with the country with most allies at the top and 
the country with the least allies at the bottom. Interestingly, though, John has 
failed to find them. At all points in time and in all possible subsets of countries 
there were always at least two countries with the same number of allies. There 
has never been a set of countries with a strictly hierarchical order that John 
was looking for—not a single case like that across the recorded history! This 
observation has struck him as interesting and significant. Since no one else 
had discovered it before, John felt that he has made an important discovery.
Let’s now revisit the two scenarios. Since all that John has done is data 
analysis, we now need to do some thinking for John. Let’s begin with Situation 
1 and the case of transitivity. If we consider all theoretically possible graphs of 
alliances it is obvious that some graphs have a transitive alliance relation, say 
the graph in Figure 1, but other graphs may  not. This means that the transitiv-
ity of the alliance relation discovered by John was a genuine empirical finding. 
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A philosopher would say that a proposition “In all networks of alliances the 
alliance relation is transitive” is a synthetic proposition—one that may be 
either true or false depending on what we find in the data. In Situation 1 the 
data have rendered this proposition true.
Now, let’s turn to Situation 2 and, by analogy, ask if the proposition “In all 
networks of alliances there are at least two countries with the same number of 
allies” is a synthetic proposition as well. Is it so that in some cases the proposi-
tion is true but in some it is false? If this proposition is synthetic then John’s 
discovery, like the discovery of transitivity, would mean a genuine empirical 
finding. But what if it is not a synthetic proposition? In that case, given the 
definition of a synthetic proposition this proposition must always be true. But 
if it is always true, regardless of the data, then it must follow deductively from 
the structure of the data. Does it?
Clearly, to move ahead with the problem we need to realize the structure 
of the data—i.e., the underlying formal theory—and try to figure out what 
follows from its axioms. Fortunately, the theory is trivial, even from a bare-
foot empiricist’s point of view and may well be the simplest theory there is. It 
consists of a finite set of objects, countries in our interpretation, and a single 
binary relation, the alliance relation α, on this set. The only assumption we 
make is the symmetry of this relation: for any a and b, if a is an ally of b then 
b is an ally of a. Our formal theory is a system 〈D, a〉 with a single axiom:
A1. (SYMMETRY OF a) ∀a,b∈D: (aab ⇒ baa).
This, of course, is a well-known theory in mathematics, a subfield of graph 
theory which is called a theory of undirected graphs. What is important for 
John, however, is what follows deductively from this simple axiom. And what 
follows is that his empirical observation was not “empirical” at all. No matter 
what system of alliances you take there will always be at least two countries 
with the same number of allies.
To prove this proposition let’s suppose, by contradiction, that there is 
a system with n different countries (n>2) where all countries have different 
number of allies. The only possible number of allies any country can have 
is one of the n numbers: 0, 1, …. , n-1. Thus if all countries have different 
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number of allies, then one of them must have 0 allies, another one 1 ally, 
another one 2 allies, …, and yet another one n-1 allies. But if a country has 
n-1 allies, it must be allied with all other countries in the system, and this 
means that the system cannot contain a country with 0 allies. This, however, 
contradicts the fact that all countries have different number of allies, and 
thus proves the proposition. 
What John has thought to be an empirical discovery, turns out not to be 
an empirical discovery at all—it is a deductive consequence of the way he has 
defined the problem. And so the proposition “In all networks of alliances there 
are at least two countries with the same number of allies” is not a synthetic 
proposition; it is not an empirical regularity at all. Philosophers call such 
propositions analytic. This means that if we properly specify the concepts 
and the assumptions we use—construct a proper theory, that is—then this 
proposition follows from the axioms.
Whenever we deal with properly defined concepts, there will always 
be empirical findings whose status we won’t know if we don’t check if the 
observed regularity does not follow from the set of assumptions that define 
these concepts. In other words, unreflective empiricism is only safe when 
a theory is trivial: either all deductive consequences of the assumptions we 
make are obvious or there are no deductive consequences at all. Whenever 
we venture into the simplest of nontrivial theories, like the theory of alliances, 
we would not know if our empirical discovery is genuine or not unless we 
first show that it is not a deductive consequence of theory’s assumptions. 
Atheoretical empiricism only makes sense in a world that has a transparently 
trivial structure. 
Perhaps my example is too simple to fool everyone though I know for a fact 
that it works on great many people. It shows that our brains are not good with 
deductions. Even if we realize the form of the theory we are working with we 
still cannot see some very simple consequences of the assumptions we make. 
But if our logical skills are dismal then the very idea of pursuing inferences 
without properly specifying all assumptions needed—i.e., without having 
a formal theory—makes about as much sense as trying to execute an addition 
without knowing what numbers we are adding. And so, my last example goes 
to the core of the problem: How good are our logical powers?
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6. The dismal shape of our scientific backbone
Since all valid inferences have to use logic, logic is our scientific backbone. 
I often come across people who think that logic is an abstract construction 
of philosophers and mathematicians and as such belongs with other esoteric 
topics that are of interest to no one but academics. They are wrong. First and 
foremost, logic is the way we (should) make inferences, not just in science, 
but in everything we do. 
To see logic at work it is enough to recall a visit to a supermarket and 
reflect on one of the shoppers in front of us whose train of thought must have 
gone somewhat like this: 
“Oh, good, the cashier has scanned all my products. Why does he keep staring at me? 
Oh, I know. I have to pay now. OK, let’s pay. How can I pay? Well, by cash, credit card, 
or a check. So, where is my money? It must be in a purse which is in my backpack. 
Let’s get it and pay cash. How much do I have to pay? All right, let’s see how much cash 
is in the purse. I have a ten, and a five, and some singles. No, I don’t have eighty-four 
dollars. All right, let’s use a credit card then. But, where are my credit cards? They 
can be in my purse. Are they? Let’s check. No, they are not. Well, they must be in my 
wallet then. But my wallet can only be in my purse or in the back pocket of my pants. 
Since it is not in my purse, it must be in the pocket. Oh yes, it is. (…)”
In science people make inferences the same way, albeit faster. 
If we can watch logic at work in a supermarket, logic must clearly be the 
backbone of our actions and thoughts. Since it is important to have a strong 
backbone we ought to take a closer look at ours.
Consider, for instance, the following dictum of Carl Sagan, a prominent 
astrophysicist and a popularizer of science. (Davidson, 1999, p. xv.)
If “experts” could always be trusted to make the right moral decision, then public 
participation would not be necessary—but they cannot be, and so it is.
If we have read over this argument without any alarms going off, my 
point that our backbone is not in good shape would have been made. This is 
because Sagan’s inference is wrong; his dictum contains a logical error. Note 
that the saying has the following structure: “If p then q. But we observe not p, 
thus we conclude not q.” For Sagan’s dictum to hold we would need “if p then 
q” implying “if not p then not q.” But, it does not. 
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The dictum’s logic is not all that more challenging than what we saw in 
the supermarket story and yet, if we don’t clearly see what is wrong with it 
we would have to concede that our backbone has failed us. Well, a slip, you 
may say, is not a big deal. Don’t we all make mistakes? Yes, we do. This is one 
point of the story. Another point of the story is that we would expect science 
to be free of such mistakes. If an engineer designs a bridge, we expect him to 
be careful about the validity of inferences he used in the construction. This 
is clearly something we would wish of anyone whose actions affect us. Even 
the most methodologically flamboyant social scientist will place his trust in 
logic when heading for a surgery. Whether we want to admit it or not, we 
all assume that people whose actions affect us do not make logical mistakes. 
Picking on Carl Sagan is important for another reason. It is the smart 
people we should watch because it is their arguments that we trust most. The 
problem, of course, is that their brains, just like everyone else’s, are not perfect. 
The more important problem with logical mistakes is that while we all make 
them; it is very seldom that we have an opportunity to recognize that we do. 
Here is my very own blunder. I must have had many of them, but, unlike the 
case below, there was no one around to point them out to me.15 The blunder 
uses Wason’s selection task experiment which I have later replicated dozens 
of times in my classes.
Suppose we have four cards and each has a letter written on one side and 
a number on the other. The four cards lie on a table and show A, B, 4 and 7. 
Which cards do you need to turn over to determine if the proposition “if A is on 
one side then 4 is on the other” is true? Should we open cards A and 4, or should 
we do something else? I am most gratified to find that a good majority of people 
are guessing A and 4. So did I. Some people guess A and 7 though, and they are 
correct. My guess of A and 4 was wrong and I would not be able to talk myself 
out of the trouble. The virtue of science is that whenever I am wrong anyone 
can prove me wrong and make me see my mistake and correct my reasoning. 
Let’s then go through the reasoning here. Why is opening A and 7 the right 
answer? For simplicity let’s use p to denote our proposition “if A is on one 
15 Many years ago professor Andrzej Nowak of the University of Warsaw has shown me 
this puzzle and was a witness to my blunder. The puzzle is well known among psychologists as 
Wason selection task (Wason 1968). 
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side then 4 is on the other.” Two things are clear. First, we don’t need to open 
B since no matter what number we find on the other side, it has no bearing 
on p being true or false, p remains true regardless. Second, we have to open 
A to check if 4 is indeed on the other side; if it not then p is, clearly, false. Now, 
how about 4 and 7? Let’s consider 4 first. If we open 4 and the letter on the 
other side is A then p is true for this card. But if the letter is not A then p is 
also true―p only claims that “if A is on one side then…” No matter what is 
on the other side of the 4 card p remains true. If we want to know if p is true 
or false opening this card is useless. The same, however, is not true about the 
card with 7: If we find A on the other side it renders p false but if the letter is 
different it renders p true. To conclude, if we want to establish if p is true or 
false we have to open cards A and 7 only.
The most compelling aspect of Wason’s example is that it uses the simplest 
of logical structures—a single implication. If we can show that most people 
get it wrong at this level, I don’t think we can get a more persuasive argument 
for constructing science in a proper form.
7. Conclusion
If our brain’s software which we use for reasoning contains glitches, as 
Wason’s selection task experiment would strongly suggest, then we face double 
peril when practicing science. First, we don’t clearly see deductive conse-
quences of the assumptions we tacitly or overtly impose on a problem. And 
second, and more disturbing perhaps, the framework which we use to make 
inferences is itself ridden with errors which make us see some true propo-
sitions as false or false propositions as true. When practicing science that 
involves any nontrivial inferences we don’t really have a choice—we have 
to do it in properly constructed theories. In political science they are called 
formal theories. 
The day when political scientists will stop using the qualifier “formal” will 
be the day when the vision of Hobbes would prevail. As long as there is a need 
to identify “formal theory” as a specific subfield of political science neither 
Hobbes, nor Wilder, nor Riker would find the status quo satisfactory.
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In conclusion I should note that it was not my objective to come up with 
an overview of the formal theory field or its comprehensive history. In my 
judgment, a different vision of the paper was more useful and this is the vi-
sion I have implemented. My reasons and objectives are explained in the 
introduction.
One reason I did not to pursue certain topics is that others have done 
that before and I found no good reason to either repeat their points or try to 
improve on their work. In closing it may be useful to mention a few of these 
sources. Morris Fiorina (1975) wrote an early overview aimed at explain-
ing to a general audience the role and the reasons for using formal theories 
in political science. It is a very good paper and I would recommend it to 
anyone interested in the subject. Paper by Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita 
(1999) provides an interesting and a comprehensive historical account of the, 
so-called, Rochester School in political science. Lalman, Oppenheimer and 
Swistak (1993) compiled a comprehensive overview of the field of formal 
theory in political science. Shepsle’s “Analytical Politics” (2010) is the best 
undergraduate textbook in the discipline. And, finally, anyone interested in 
the most recent advances in the field should consult the book of Humphreys 
(2017.) It provides a wealth of specific applications.
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